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Abstract
In the paradigm social choice problem, there is a fixed set of alternatives and a fixed set of voters. This paper
considers variations of the electorate, when some subset of voters has a special voice on some subset of
alternatives. Such a situation is formalized by means of the veto function. We focus on stable veto functions,
and exhibit a liberal social choice function and a promotion mechanism which are stable. A notion of stability
for groups whose membership itself is the social state is investigated. The latter is useful in analyzing the
membership of the Politburo of the Communist Party (USSR), 1926-1930.
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In the paradigm social choice problem, there is a fixed set of
alternatives and a fixed set of voters. This paper considers variations
of the electorate, when some subset of voters has a special voice on some
subset of alternatives. Such a situation is formalized by means of the
veto function. We focus on stable veto functions, and exhibit a liberal
social choice function and a promotion mechanism which are stable. A
notion of stability for groups whose membership itself is the social state
is investigated. The latter is useful in analyzing the membership of the
Politburo of the Communist Party (USSR), 1926-1930.
INTRODUCTION
In the paradigm social choice problem» there is a fixed set of
alternatives A'and a fixed set of voters N. Structure is added to the
problem by imposing restrictions on admissible profiles of voters'
preferences or on the characteristics of the social choice function.
If one allows for unrestricted domain of preference profiles and requires
only that social choice be non-empty, essentially no structure is added.
This paper considers social choice functions, all of which have a
variable electorate structure: different groups of voters have a
special voice on different subsets of alternatives. Examples of such
situations abound in practicc. VThen a society is deliberating an extension
of the franchise, those presently enfranchised have a special voice on
the enfranchisement of others. Property rights give an agent a special
voice of those social states that concern his property. Rank often
gives an agent a special voice on questions of promotion in a hierarchy.
Although such social choice functions are important, they have not
been much studied in the formal literature. Two important exceptions to
this should be cited at once. First, the literature on liberal social
choice functions (Sen, 1976) studies a special kind of electorate
variation, akin to property rights. Second, KleVorick and Kramer (1973)
and Gardner (1981) give examples of convergent sequences of social choice,
where at each step of the sequence, an agent's voting strength is social
state-dependent. UTiat the present paper proposes is a general formalism
for dealing with variable electorates, the veto function. Interest focuses
in the next section on stable veto functions, those which lead to non-empty
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social choice and have non-empty cores. Section 3 applies stable veto
functions to the question of liberal social choice. Here we prove the
existence of a strategically consistent liberal social -function, essentially
Gibbard's system of first-order rights (Gibbard, 1974). We also exhibit
a stable veto function within a rank hierarchy. Section 4 deals with
electorate expansion and contraction, A stable veto function upheld
by a stable group, that is one whose members wish neither to purge existing
members nar to recruit new ones. We show the existence of stable groups,
and introduce a dynamic adjustment process for the variations in the member
ship of unstable-groups. The latter is applied to the membership in the
Politburo of the Communist Party (USSR) during a period of considerable
instability, 1925-1930. The concluding section attempts to put these
results in perspective, both with respect to known results and with respect
to promising avenues for further work.
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2. The Veto Function
Let A be a fixed set of m social alternatives, m 5. 3; N, a fixed
_set of n voters^, n >. 2, Each individual i in N has an irreflexive, tran
sitive, and complete ordering of the alternatives in A. A social
choice function f is a map f: H -*• 2 - 4", where 2^ is the set of all
subsets of A and 4' is the empty set.
To formalize the notion that a certain subset of voters S C N has
a special voice on a certain subset of alternatives Bti A, one introduces
the veto function V, B e V(S) means that the members of S have the power
V
to veto the set of alternatives B from the social choice set. The full
veto power of coalition S. V(S), is the collection of all subsets of
alternatives over which S has veto power. The veto function can be
considered the dual of the effectivity function of Moulin and Peleg (Moulin
and Peleg, 1980). Clearly, $ CV(S) C 2^; the following conditions
demand more.
Standardness. For all S e 2^, ^ e V(S), A i V(S).
A coalition may be powerless ($ = V(S)), but no coalition may stymie the
social choice (A e V(S)).
Pareto. V(N) = 2^^ - A.
The grand coalition has veto poxi/er consistent with standardness.
Monotonicity. B e V(S) and B^B', then B' e V(S).
If a coalition can veto B, it can veto any subset of B.
Superadditivity. ^ If Sj^ and S2 are disjoint coalitions, Bj^ e V(Sj^)
and B2 e V(S2)» then Bj^^ B2 e V(Si^^ ^2^'
Disjoint coalitions do not lose veto power when they join forces.
Given these four conditions, one can readily deduce another laonotonicity
condition: if B e V(S) and S C T, then B e V(T). The veto power of an
enlarged coalition does not shrink. To show this, consider the coalitions
S and T-S. B e V(S) by hypothesis, while ^ e V(T-S) by standardness.
By superadditivity, $ B = B e V(&n-^T-S) = V(T).
A simple example of veto function is the representation of the Pareto—
extension rule, V(S) is empty unless S = N, in which case V(S) is given
by ths Pareto condition. More generally, for any social choice mechanism
where a coalition is either winning (has the veto power of the grand
coalition) or losing (has no veto power), one has
/V(N) if S is winning
V(S) =4
^ $ otherwise
Such structures would apply for example to majority rule and oligarchical
rule. However, - such simple examples do not involve any variation of the
electorate.
A more complicated example, which does involve variation of the electorate,
2
is based on the notion of an ideal over A. Recall that an ideal over A,
I^, is a collection of subsets of A satisfying the conditions:
* e A Ia
B e and B*C B, then B' a:
B e and B' e I^, then BuB' e
Now for each coalition S ^ N, let V(S) be an ideal over A, denoted I^(S).
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For disjoint S,S' for which S S' 3^ N, let V(S S') be. the minimal ideal
containing and I^(S'). Finally, V(N) is given by the Pareto condition.
Note however that 2^ - A is not an ideal over A. Such a construction satisfies
the conditions for a veto function, and will be used repeatedj-y in the
sequel.
A coalition must have both the will and the power to exercise its
veto,-.' this regard, a rather conservative criterion governs the will
to veto: no member of a coalition ever regrets the exercise of that
coalition's veto. Formally, let x^(S) denote the set {y e A: yP^x for
all i E S}. Then S exercises its veto over x if and only if A - x^(S) e V(S).
An alternative is stable if no coalition exercises its veto against
it. A veto function V is stable if the set of stable alternatives is
non-empty. Stable veto functions have two interpretations, first as
social choice functions, and second as .cooper&clve games in normal form.
In the latter interpretation, the strategy set of each coalition consists
of its veto options. In particular, the core of a stable veto function
is non-empty. A stable veto function is strategically consistent social
choice, since outcomes sincerely revealed by preferences are in the core
of the corresponding cooperative game. Stable veto functions thus form
the focus . of the sections that follow.
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3. Liberal Veto Functions
This section considers the veto function representation of social
choice satisfying a liberalism condition, A minimal liberalism condition
is Introduced, which is common to both Sen's condition L (Sen, 1970) and
Gibbard*s condition (Gibbard, 1974). The main result is that the veto
function satisfying minimal liberalism and the ideal-based construction
is stable. However, stronger liberalism conditions jeopardize stability.
The minimal, condition of liberalism is that for'each individual 1
there is a social state over which 1 has veto power. Suppose that no
two individuals have veto power over the same social state; then each
individuals veto state can be thought of as his protected sphere. In
terms of the veto function, one has:
Minimal Liberalism. For all i e N,'V({1}) =
Under minimal liberalism, each Individual's veto function is an ideal.
The veto function for groups is based on the ideal construction of the
last section. Thus, the veto function of {l,j} is the ideal
V({i.j}) = {0,{x^}, {x^}, {x.,x^^ }}.
To satisfy the standardness condition, altsrnatlves must outnumber voters;
otherwise, V(S) contains A for some S N.
Under the no-regret hypothesis, one can now show the following:
Proposition 1. Let the veto function V satisfy minimal liberalism
and the ideal-based construction. If alternatives outnumber voters, then
-7-
V is stable.
Proof, Since alternatives outnumber voters, there is at least one alter
native against which no individual has a veto; call this alternative w.
If w is Pareto optimal, then N does not exercise a veto against it. If
Ndoes not exer^cise a veto against w, neither does any subset S of N; for
if S does exercise its veto against w, this implies that some member of
S has a veto against w, a contradiction. Thiis, if w is Pareto optimal,
w is stable. Suppose that w is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists w'
such stat w'Pj^w for all i. At most one individual i has a veto against
However, i cannot exercise his veto against w', nor can any coalition
containing i,since the set of alternatives A-w'^C{i}) contains w, against
which no individual has a veto. Therefore, if w* is Pareto optimal, w*
is stable. If hot, then there exists w*' Pareto superior to w'. By
finiteness of A, repeating the argument must lead to an alternative which
is stable. Hence, V is stable.
To illustrate, suppose m= 3, n = 2, = x, x^ == y- The stable outcomes
of the veto function V are found in table 1, where Xj^X2X^ means X2^PX2PX2.
Note in the table that since no individual has a veto against z, it appears
as a stable outcome unless it is Pareto inferior to some other alternative.
The veto function satisfying minimal liberalism is mainly of theoretical
interest, since'the liberalism conditions proposed in the literature are
substantially stronger. However, it is not hard to extend minimal liberalism
along such lines. Thus, -Sen's condition L (Sen, 1970) requires that for
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each individual 1, there exist a pair of alternatives such that
i is decisive over the pair in either direction of preference. The veto
function representation of this is
V({i} = {$, {x^j^ }, {xi2
The veto function for an individual is no longer an ideal; nevertheless,
I '
the veto function can be extended to larger coali'tions in an obvious way,
involving unions and Cartesian products. For instance, the veto function
for {i,j} satisfies
V({i,j}) -V( {i }) U'>V({j })W (x^j,,xi2) X (xji.xj2),
X denoting Cartesian product. Proposition 1 continues to hold for the
liberalism function so extended. Table 2 shows the difference that this
makes to the outcomes.
The social choice function in table 2 has already been mentioned
in the literature: it accords what Gibbard calls a system of first-order
rights (Gibbard, 1974, p. 403). What Proposition 1 implies is that for
such a system of rights, the sincere outcome is also in the core of the
associated cooperative game. For systems according higher-order rights,
in particular for systems satisfying Gibbard*s condition L2, the above
strategic consistency no longer obtains. A sincere outcome need not be
in the core (Gardner, 1980). Thus, there is an inevitable conflict between
























































































































































































































































































To see how such a veto function might arise in practice, suppose that
1 and 2 belong to a hierarchy in which 1 outranks 2. In particular, 1
can veto 2*s promotion. Either, however, may veto the recruitment of
an outsider (individual 3) to the hierarchy. Thus the social states are:
X » promote 2, recruit 3 y « not promote 2, recruit 3
z = promote 2, uot recruit 3 w = not promote 2, not recruit 3,
w being the status quo. Individual I's veto .function consists of {x,y,z }
and all of its subsets by virtue of his rank. Individual 2*s veto function
consists of {x,y} and its subsets. In this case, the status quo is the
alternative against which no individual has a veto. Again applying the
argument of Proposition 1, this veto function, which is a mixture of
minimal and Sen liberalism, is stable. An individual is promoted or recruited
only if no higher ranking individual vetoes his promotion or recruitment.
An individual who succeeds in getting promoted or recruited is thus blackball-
proof.
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4. Veto Functions for Recruitment and Purge
This section takes up the question of variation in the group of voters
itself. Two types of variation are considered, recruitments (expansions)
and purges (contractions). These variations require an amendment of the
conditions for veto function. To see this, let Nq be the current set of
voters and N the set of all logically possible voters. Then the group-
membership agenda is 2^ = A, and the empty set cannot be excluded (the
group may want to dissolve). Thus the standardness and Fareto conditions
now read:
Standardness', For all S C Nq, $ e V(S).
Pareto', V(Nq) = 2^.
However, one of the main concerns is when the group does not dissolve.
The concept of individual preferences also poses some problems, since
I
the alternatives being ordered are themselves sets of individuals.
Here, although it is not necessary for the results, the presentation is
greatly simplified by assuming that preferences are measurable. Let
be an ordering of 2^ and its numerical representation, u^ is measurable
when
Uj_(S) « E u (j) .
jeS
Agent i tlinks J is good when u^(j) > 0; bad, when u^(j) < 0. Agent i
\
thinks the current group is bad when u^(Nq) < 0. The empty set itself
has no value: u^($) = 0. Such preferences are measurable in the sense
that u^(j) measures the utility difference between a group containing j
-12-
or not.
Preferences are selfish when each individual thinks himself good.
Denote by G(i) the set of members j that i thinks good:
1
G(i) = { jeN: > 0 } .
For any group S, G(S) denotes the set of individuals unanimously considered
good by S:
G(S) = r\ G(i).
S
One can also define the analogous bad sets, B(i) and B(S). With selfish
preferences, G(i) is never empty.
In view of the complications raised by the preference side of the
model, we restrict attention to veto functions of the form
(2^ if S is winning
v(s) =1
otherwise.
The notion of. winning here is relative to Nq. Let Wbe the set of winning
coalitions relative to Nq:
W= { SC.'N^: S is winning },
Finally, let C(Nq) denote the group which is part of every winning coalition:
g(nq) = s.
S E W
C(Nq) is non-empty when Wrepresents an oligarchy or collegial polity.(Brown,1975)
Let the group membership question, both purge and recruitment, be
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considered simultaneously. The next proposition gives a simple condition
under which the group does not dissolve;
Proposition 2. Suppose preferences are selfish. Then G(Nq)V>
is contained in, the outcome of the group membership question.
Proof. Restrict attention to a winning coalition S. G(S) O G(Nq).
By the hypothesis of measurability of utility, for any group S', the
members of S unanimously prefer G(Hq)US' to S*. Thus, if G(Nq) C
they are not purged, and if they are not members, they are recruited.
Again, if preferences are selfish, then every member i"of .C(Sq)
prefers Nq to N - {i}. Since i is a member of every winning coalition,
no purge of i can take place.
Under the Pareto extension rule, Nq = C(Nq). When preferences are
selfish, no current member is purged. This result can be compared to
those of the last section, since a natural liberal condition in this case
would be that no agent be purged unless he judges himself bad (u^(i) < 0).
Such a condition , although it would guarantee that the group not dissolve,
would nevertheless conflict with the principle of majority rule, however
qualified.
^-Jhen the outcome of the group, menibership question is the group itself,
one can call the group stable. Its members wish to carry out no purges,
nor do they wish to recruit further members. Even if Nq is not stable,
one would expect there to be some other set which is stable. The following
proposition shows the existence of a stable group under majority rule.
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Froposition 3. If at least one agent's preferences are selfish, then
there exists a stable group relative to majority rule.
Proof, We shall prove a slightly stronger result, that there exists a
maximal stable group.
Let V be an n-dimensional square matrix of I's and -I's;
- 1 if u^(j) > 0, -1 if u^(j) < 0.'
Let X be an n-dimensional row vector representing group membership:
K 1 if i e S, 0 otherwise.
The maxirAal stable group is defined by the following linear programming
problem (LP):
maximize Sx^
subject to X A_ ^ 0
O
i
•^N-S ^ ^ IT
0 < 1
where A « {columns A. in A; j e S }.
S j
The first constraint corresponds to the fact that in a stable group
no member is purged (has a m^jprity opposed); the second, to the fact that
no further member is recruited (has a majority in favor). The problem
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is feasible since x = 0 is a feasible solution. The problem is bounded
since < n. Hence,, there exists an optimal solution. As long as
V has one positive element, the 0-vector is not optimal and the maximal
group is not empty.
Note that only a very weak form of measurability was needed to establish
the above result. Also, Proposition 3 can be extended to the cases where
C(Nq) is not empty, simply by adding constraints to the problem (LP).
The proposition gives a simple test for when the largest possible group
N is stable, namely, that the column sums of V all be non-negative.
Given the existence of stable groups, one is led to define the group
membership dynamics where is the group at decision stage
t and f(N|.) is the outcome of the group membership decision at t. Indeed,
if S = Nj. is stable, then it is a fixed point of the dynamics, S = f(S),
One might suppose that these dynamics are stable, in the sense that they
converge to a stable-group. However, this need not be the-case, as the
following example shows.
Let N e {1,2,3,4,5} and the V matrix satisfy
/
V
Suppose Nq = {1,2,3,4 }. Asfcrict majority wins. Then {1,2,3 } purge 4,
{2,3,4 } purge 1, il;3,i} piirge 2.,i^{l,2,4..}..purge 3, while'all,recuit 5, So
{5} = fCNp). 5 in turn recruits everyone, so N« f(N]^). At this point.
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the purges recommence. Thus, the membership oscillates between N and
(5), neither of which is stable.
We conclude the discussion with an example which is stable. N is
as before, but now playet 1 has a veto. Player 1 and any two other players
win. Nq = {1,2,3 } and V satisfies
V
f(N ) = {1,3,4 }, since {1,3} purge 2 and recruit 4. f(Ni) - {1,4,5 },
0
since {1,4} purge 3 and recruit»5. The group is now stable, and the dynamics
C
have converged.'
This last example has an interesting historical interpretation. Let
1 = Stalin, 2 = the Trotsky faction, 3 = the Bukharin faction, 4 = the
>
Stalin faction of 1927, 5 = the Stalin, faction of 1930, the group in
question being the Politburo of the Communist Party (USSR). The decision
period encompasses 1925-1930. As first secretery of the Party, Stalin is
a veto player and hence purge-proof. The membership dynamics are suiranarized
in Table At the first decision stage, Stalin and the Bukharin faction
purge the Trotsky faction and recruit the first wave of Stalin supporters.
K
At the second decision stage, Stalin and his supporters purge the Bukharin
faction and recruit the second wave of Stalin supporters. This process
reached its logical climax in the great Purge Trials of 1936, when the
Trotsky faction • ±s condemned to death and 1938, when the Bukharin faction
Table 3\ Membership in the Politburo of the Communist Party (USSR),
1925-1930.
Name 1925 1927 1930
















x'= member at that date
-18-
meets the same fate.^
The historical interpretation raises an intriguing problem. If the
Bukharin faction knew that the Stalin recruits would vote to purge them,
then x^hy did they participate in the purge of the Trotsky faction?
One answer is that, from the standpoint of group preferences, the Bukharin
faction found a Politburo consisting of Stalin and his supporters preferable
to one consisting of Stalin, the Trotsky faction, and themselves. This
is hard to swallow. Another answer is that, even though they found such
a transformation of the Politburo undesirable, they were nonetheless willing
to sacrifice their interests for the "greater good of the party." Indeed,
this is one interpretation of Bukharin*s confession at his 1938 trial.^
Most likely, however, the Bukharin faction simply blundered, based on
misinformation about Stalin supporters' preferences and misjudgment of




This paper has shown how some questions of variation in the electorate
can be handled in social choice theory. The basic formalism for dealing
with the extra structure found in electorate variation is the veto function.
Veto functions- for liberal social choice and for group membership questions
have been developed. A useful corollary to the liberal veto function
construction is the discovery of a strategically consistent liberal social
choice function. This construction aids in modeling questions of promotion
in a hierarchy.^ The veto function for group membership shows how to
define stability for groups and dynamics for group membership. The
explanatory potential of this framework is indicated by the Politburo
application. Application to other historical examples, for instance the
Fourteenth or Nineteenth Amendments, might be even more interesting.^
The results presented reveal another side of the conflict between
liberal and majoritarian values. As far as membership in a group is
concerned, liberal principles would seem to imply that only the individual
has the right ro resign or to retain membership. No majority, no matter
how large, can expel a member against his will. Just the opposite
conclusion follows from majoritarian principles, ^-Jhat is clear is that
unbridled majoritarianism can lead the group to dissolve. The veto
function approach brings this conflict to the level of logical irrecon
cilability.
Social choice theory is becoming more and more concerned with structured
social choice, and rightly so. What we have tried to show here is that
the veto function has an important role to play in this line of research.
-20-
FOOTNOTES
*The author wishes to thank F. Breyer, A. Denzau, S. Matthews, and R.
Rosenthal for their helpful conunents. The errors which remain are the
author's own. A preliminary version was presented at the 1981 Public Choice
Meetings.
1. I am grateful to A. Denzau and R. Rosenthal for correcting an earlier
misstatement of this condition.
2. (Brown, 1975) first introduced this notion into social choice theory.
3. According to (von Wright, 1972), this proposal was first suggested
by G. E. Moore.
4. The data on politburo membership are found in (Conquest, 1968). oian
5. With two exceptions. Trotsky, having already been deported, could not
be tried. He was sentenced to death in absentia, and later assassinated.
Tomsky escaped his death sentence by committing suicide.
6. See (Tucker and Cohen, 1965), especially pages XL-XLII, where such
an interpretation is ultifwately rejected.
7. This possibility was pointed out by A. Denzau.
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